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be considered a servant of the hospital. At the most, the hospital has
merely divided its control over the employee and not relinquished it
completely to the doctor. In such a case, there is an inference that
the original service continues and the employee remains in the hospital's employment during the performance of any work entrusted
to him by the hospital.
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The application of the doctrine of respondeat superior to hospitals,
places the liability of the hospital on the familar principles applied to
all other employers. It assures the injured person that he can look
to the proper party for compensation.
"Certainly, person who avails himself of 'hospital facilities'
expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its
2
nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility.s 1
FRANCIS SEROOGY

Contracts: Impossibility of Performance Caused by Promisor's
Negligent Mistake- Plaintiff was third party beneficiary of a
contract entered into by her father, the deceased, with her mother,
which contract was embodied in a divorce decree. Under the agreement, deceased promised to continue paying premiums upon an insurance policy in which plaintiff was named beneficiary. Unknown to
both contracting parties, the policy in question had lapsed some twelve
years prior to the divorce agreement. When plaintiff discovered this
fact, after her father's death, she filed a claim against his estate for
the face value of the policy. Defendant, the executrix of his estate,
contended that the nonexistence of the insurance policy at the time
the alleged contract was entered into prevented any contract from
having been formed. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff and
defendant appealed. Held: Judgment affirmed. The nonexistence of
the essential subject matter to a contract does not void the contract
when the promisor, due to his own negligence, failed to discover the
facts which made performance by him impossible. In re Zelimer's
Estate, 1 Wis. 2d 46, 82 N. W. 2d 891 (1957).
The established rule concerning the effect of the nonexistence of
the subject matter of a contract may be briefly stated as follows:
"Where parties assume to contract and there is a mistake
with reference to any material part of the subject, there is no
contract because of the want of mutual assent necessary to
create one; and in this connection it has been said that mistake
does not so much affect the validity of a contract, as it does to
AGENCY §227, comment b (1933). But see the Swigerd case, supra note 19, where the court held that when an employee is acting pursuant to a
doctor's instructions, the hospital is liable only if the injury-producing act
is "administrative." Like the Schloendorff rule, this bases the whole question
of responsibility on the nature of the act alone, rather than on all of the facts
involved in the particular case.
21 2 N.Y.2d at 667, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11, 143 N.E.2d at 8.
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prevent its inception, and that mistake may be such as to
prevent any real agreement from being formed, so that the
apparent contract is void both in law and equity and not .. .
merely voidable."'
This rule, of course, is always qualified by the statement that a contract is valid if one or both of the parties has assumed the risk of
the nonexistence of the subject matter. 2 But it is manifestly evident
that such were not the facts in this case.
The decided cases on the question of the nonexistence of essential
subject matter are few and the question of the negligence of the
promisor in this regard can be found in only one other case.' The
Wisconsin Court bases its decision squarely upon the Restatement of
Contracts where it is stated:
"Except . . . where a contrary intention is manifested, a

promise imposes no duty if performance of the promise is impossible because of facts existing when the promise is made
of which the promisor neither knows nor has reason to know."'
[Emphasis supplied.]
The comments to the section do not refer at all to the final phrase,
nor is the question discussed in any of the standard legal treatises on
contracts. The Wisconsin Court seems, therefore, to have taken the
initial step concerning this admittedly seldom litigated point of law.
In holding the contract valid because of the promisor's negligence,
while refraining from discussing at any length the implications of
such a holding, the Court leaves unanswered some interesting questions. In cases of this sort, but where the negligence is not so manifest,
will the issue go to the jury with instructions the same as would be
given in a tort action of negligence? Or will the defendant, on some
theory of estoppel, be denied the opportunity to show the nonexistence
upon which he relies? This rather anomalous blending of tort action
with contract action could produce unusual results. Of course the
question will not go to the jury if the promisor admits that he either
knew or assumed the risk of the nonexistence of the subject matter.
If it is claimed that he had reason to know of the nonexistence, then
it will be a fact issue which properly should go to the jury after the
promisor has been given a chance to attempt to convince the jury that
his position was not unreasonable. Estoppel would only apply if there
were fraud or perhaps gross negligence coupled with a change of
position by the promisee. 5
The possible difficulties mentioned above could not arise if the
Court had based its decision on the theory advanced by the High
117 C.J.S. Contracts §135 (1939).
2 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1559 (rev. ed. 1936).
3 McRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Commission, 84 Commw. L. R. 377 (1951).
4
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §456 (1932).
51 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §398 (rev. ed. 1936).
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Court of Australia in the McRae case. 6 It was there held that the
defendants were liable because the contract impliedly included a
promise that the subject matter existed, and since there was no subject matter, the contract was breached and defendants must respond
in damages. Admittedly this is an ingenious means to reach a desired
result, but, notwithstanding scholarly support for such reasoning, the
Wisconsin Court was astute enough to see where the consequences
of such a holding might lead. Carrying the Australian Court's reasoning to its logical conclusion, liability would be imposed on a completely innocent promisor, where, by mutual mistake the essential subject matter was nonexistent. This, in effect, would render the doctrine
of impossibility of performance a nullity.
Granted that the impossibility doctrine is a relatively recent addition to the common law, having been engrafted thereon from Roman
civil law, s nevertheless it has had a salutary effect on the harshness of
contract law as developed under early common law principles. This
doctrine, along with the related doctrine of frustration of purpose,
has been steadily growing in importance in recent years. 9 However,
in the light of the position taken by the Restatement and the holdings
in the Zellmer and McRae cases, it appears that there is a recognized
need for some limitations on the doctrine lest the basic principles governing contract law be too narrowly circumscribed.
It is submitted that such a limitation could be achieved by basing
decisions arising from facts such as are present in the instant case on
principles of mistake rather than those of impossibility. 10 True, the
general principal is that mutual mistake of a material fact will make
However a long line of Wisa contract voidable by either side."
consin decisions hold that a party cannot claim mistake when his
erroneous belief is the result of his own negligence. 12 Hence, in the
instant case, since Dr. Zellmer's own negligence resulted in his erroneous belief as to existence of the insurance policy, he could not
rely on the mistaken theory to invalidate the contract. It is suggested,
therefore, that should future controversies arise, involving facts similar
to those in the Zellmer case, they be decided, whenever possible, on
familiar principles of mistake, thereby not only achieving an equitable
limitation upon the impossibility doctrine but also providing a more
authoritatively sound basis for the decision than that in the instant case.
R. CHARLES
6 See note 3 supra.
715 MODERN L. REv. 229 (1952).
8 6 WILLIs'oN, CONTRACTS §1931, note 9 (rev. ed. 1936).
9 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS §1320 (1951).
10 5 PAGE, Contracts §2670 (1921).
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11 12 Ai i. JUR., Contracts §131. (1938).
12 Kowalke v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co., 103 Wis. 472, 79 N.W. 762 (1899)

Grant Marble Co. v. Abbot, 142 Wis. 279, 124 N.W. 264 (1910); Meeme
Mut. H.P.F. Ins. Co. v. Lorfield, 194 Wis. 322, 216 N.W.507 (1927).

